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Democracy and consensus in traditional Africa: 







This article examines Kwasi Wiredu’s arguments on democracy and consensus. In 
Cultural Universals and Particulars, Wiredu presented consensual democracy as a 
better means of decision-making process than majoritarian democracy in traditional 
African life and governance. He defended this claim with two main arguments: (i) 
that consensus takes care of the interests of the minority, and (ii) that consensual 
democracy permits substantive representations. Contrary to Wiredu’s claim, this 
article argues that the implication or challenges of majoritarian democracy 
identified by Wiredu do not necessarily (i) undermine majoritarian democracy, and 
(ii) make Wiredu’s suggested decision by consensus a workable means of 
decision-making in present African society. Our aim in this paper is not to defend 
majoritarian democracy as a plausible position; rather, the bulk of the paper is 
devoted to a critical assessment of Wiredu’s defense of consensual democracy. 
The paper argues that at a certain level of discussion, Wiredu’s idea of consensus 
(consensual democracy) shares some similarities and also faces similar challenges 
to (majoritarian) democracy. The paper concludes that, logically speaking, 
democracy and consensus are not mutually exclusive. 
Keywords: Democracy, consensus, minority interests, traditional African life, African politics
Introduction 
The article seeks to examine and assess Kwasi Wiredu’s view on consensual democracy with its 
majoritarian democracy counterpart, particularly as it affects the issues of minority interests and 
better representation. Kwame Wiredu is one of the outstanding African scholars who have 
contributed immensely in the area of social and political philosophy in the continent. One of his 
outstanding publications is Cultural Universals and Particulars. Given the enormity of the 
problems that confront contemporary African politics and political life, the search for a suitable 
system of governance propelled Wiredu to come up with a proposal. In Chapter Fourteen of 
Cultural Universals and Particulars, Wiredu emphasises the incompatibility of democracy 
(majoritarian democracy) as a means of decision-making and governance with the nature of 
traditional African life. Instead, for him, a better alternative for decision-making in traditional 
African life and governance is consensus (consensual democracy). Wiredu argues that despite 
the complexities of contemporary African life, consensual non-party precedents of traditional 
African politics are still usable and indispensable. What does this suggest? For something to be 
indispensable, it implies that such a thing is so good or important that you could not manage 
without it. One quick important question that comes to mind is: how indispensable is this 
consensual democracy? This paper examines and challenges Wiredu’s view on democracy and 
consensus. Wiredu’s argument is that consensus or consensual democracy which was practised 
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in traditional African society takes better care of some fundamental moral problems in Africa than 
the majoritarian democracy which is in vogue in modern African society. Some of the problems 
identified are the problem of minority interests/rights, as well as the problem of better 
representation. How tenable is the above claim? Essentially, this view has become controversial 
among African scholars in the sense that while some scholars have supported Wiredu’s claim, 
others rejected the claim with contrary arguments. 
Arising from the above, what is the state of the existing literatures on the subject matter? 
Among the scholars who have reacted to Wiredu’s submission is Emmanuel Eze. What exactly 
was Eze’s position? Eze’s criticised Wiredu on two main grounds. These criticisms are the 
following.
First, Wiredu indulges in misleading romanticism and an excessive rationalism in his 
normative accounts of pre-colonial Akan society. Second, Wiredu’s arguments in favour of the 
pre-colonial Akan non-party style of politics can function just as well to defend the single-party 
platforms of the early nationalists whose monopoly on political power required the rigid 
suppression of democratic freedom (Eze 1999:213).
Eze’s criticism appeared to be an acceptable view despite Wiredu’s disclaimer of 
presenting an exaggeration of unbroken harmony in African society (Wiredu 1995:53,1995:182). 
Meanwhile, Bernard Matolino responded to Emmanuel Eze’s critique of Wiredu with the 
argument that consensual democracy has more appeal than Eze is prepared to concede 
(Matolino 2005:34). However, after juxtaposing Eze’s and Wiredu’s views, Helen Lauer submitted 
that the respective concerns of Wiredu and Eze appear to be compatible, on a careful reading 
(Lauer 2019:41-59). What exactly is the point of Lauer’s view above? Her argument tends 
towards the fact that there is no factual disagreement between Wiredu and Eze on the subject 
matter. Recently, in an attempt to reinforce Wiredu’s claim, Barry Halen also suggested that 
consensual democracy should be re-examined as a possibly more suitable and sensible 
alternative for sub-Saharan Africa given the prevalent challenges in the continent (Halen 
2019:2).
Arising from the above literature, our concern in this paper is not to repeat what these 
scholars have done. Instead, we make bold attempts to consider a certain issue that is yet to be 
properly addressed by some of these scholars, which has created a research gap that this paper 
intends to fill. The problem is really whether the practice of consensus (consensual democracy) 
really escapes the problems that have bedevilled (majoritarian) democracy. Are democracy and 
consensus mutually exclusive? An answer is provided in the paper, which will also consider how 
the issue of conceptual crisis undermines Wiredu’s consensual democracy. 
The paper has three main sections. The first considers conceptual clarifications of the two 
major concepts in this paper, democracy and consensus. The second section focuses on 
Wiredu’s defence of government by consensus or consensual democracy. The third section 
focuses on an assessment of Wiredu’s arguments. In the final analysis, the paper concludes that 
democracy and consensus are not mutually exclusive.
Democracy and consensus: conceptual analysis
To start a paper of this nature requires consideration and clarification of the two important 
working concepts in the paper, democracy and consensus.
Democracy
The question to be addressed here is: what is democracy? Democracy as we understand it from 
subject literature is a complex concept with different meanings and interpretations by scholars in 
different epochs. The reality of the existence of varieties or different versions of democracy also 
makes it difficult to come up with a singular acceptable definition that will capture all the varieties 
of the concept. As it is being practised, democracy could be described as direct, representative 
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or participatory. There is majoritarian democracy as well as consensual democracy. Given the 
definitional crisis, is the definition of the concept “democracy” elusive? Maybe not. The reason for 
this answer is that most of the definitions given to democracy contain certain features or 
elements of what democracy is all about. One thing that scholars have agreed on is that 
etymologically, the concept is coined from two Greek words, demos meaning “people”, and 
kratos which means “to govern or to rule”. Thus, democracy is often defined literally as the 
government of the people or majority. Abraham Lincoln, for instance, defines democracy as “The 
government of the people, for the people, and by the people.’’1 
George Orwell rightly remarks: 
A word like democracy not only [has] ... no agreed definition, but the attempt to make 
one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country 
democratic, we are praising it: consequently, the defender of every kind of regime 
claims that it is a democracy and fears that they might have to stop using the word if it 
were tied down to any one meaning (Orwell,1968: 32).
The point about Orwell’s view is that democracy now appears to be the standard way of 
governing any society in the world in such a way that those countries that are not democratic in 
nature still try to appear so to the rest of the world. One factor that may be responsible for the 
general acceptability of democracy could be due to the notion of legitimacy that is attached to it. 
In Wiredu’s conception, given the complex nature of the interpretation of the concept, democracy 
could be understood either as a majoritarian democracy or as a consensual democracy. 
Majoritarian democracy is the form of government tbased on the majority principle. Meanwhile, 
Consensual democracy could be defined as a form of democracy in which government is 
effected by consent and subject to the control of the people as expressed through their 
representatives (Wiredu 1995: 58-59).
More importantly, in Teffo’s analysis, one can find what could be described as the minimum 
package or requirement for democracy. According to Teffo, “Logically, democracy has to be 
representative, accountable, and participatory” (Teffo 1995:140). Given the array of definitions 
above, one important factor that is common to all is hat democracy as a system of government is 
people-centred. Regardless of whichever form it takes, people’s interests are always the focus. 
With this background on democracy as a concept, let us now move to the next concept, 
consensus. 
Consensus and conceptual crisis
What is consensus? Over time “consensus” has carried very different meanings. According to 
Martin Benjamin, “A consensus is, most generally, an agreement or collective unanimous opinion 
among a number of persons” (Martin 1995:241). This definition is unique because it involves total 
agreement. That is, everyone is involved. In the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, consensus is 
defined as the judgement arrived at by most of those concerned.2 The point of emphasis of this 
definition is that it involves the agreement of ‘most’ of the people concerned and not total 
agreement. Consensus decision-making is also described as a creative and dynamic way of 
reaching agreement between all members of a group. In fact, Brian William in his own 
conception identified different accounts of consensus. According to him, 
By “consensus levels” I simply mean levels of agreement achieved among government 
representatives within state legislatures. So, for example, a “simple majority” 
consensus level would be fifty percent plus one vote, while a unanimous consensus 
level would be when everybody agrees (William 2012:559). 
1.  Abraham Lincoln’s definition is considered one of the most cited definitions of democracy. That does not mean that the 
definition captures everything about democracy. 
2.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 
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One helpful deduction from William’s account of consensus is that it (consensual 
democracy) is not really different from majoritarian democracy because consensus can be 
reached either through majority agreement or by total agreement. 
In the same spirit, Christoph Haug identifies four different classifications of consensus in his 
analysis of consensus decision-making. These are:
•  Imposed consensus, 
•  Acclaimed consensus, 
•  Basic consensus, and 
•  Deliberative consensus (Haug 2015:556). 
As a rider, Haug explains that in an imposed consensus, it is simply claimed (e.g. by the 
meeting’s chair) that consensus has been reached with no opportunity for the participants to 
oppose this claim (Haug 2015:556). In an acclaimed consensus, in contrast, there is an explicit 
opportunity for participants to express their views, but its official purpose is not to express dissent 
but consent (Haug 2015:556). In a basic consensus participants are explicitly asked if there is 
anyone who disagrees, and a stretch of substantial silence passes before the consensual 
decision is confirmed (Haug 2015:556). Deliberative consensus, finally, not only gives 
participants the opportunity to express dissent, but actively encourages that dissent is articulated 
in order to ensure that no one is silenced (Haug 2015:556). Arising from the above view, one 
important point that must be made is that Haug’s fourth conception, as presented in this paper 
captures Wiredu’s point. Those holding minority views can accept consensual agreements 
reached, despite continued disagreement, by virtue of having, in some meaningful way, a rational 
and even practical investments when the talking has stopped and decision has been made. The 
import of the above view is that Wiredu’s concern for the minority in basically the process of 
practical outcome of a rational deliberation. 
From the above explanation, it appears that deliberative consensus is far better than other 
forms of consensus. Why? It is in the deliberative consensus that the main aim of taking care of 
the interests of everybody can be achieved. This does not mean that I agree with Wiredu; there is 
a way in which majoritarian democracy could also accommodate deliberations. Further 
explanation shall be done later. Just like Wiredu, Nelson Mandela of South Africa is another 
African thinker whose view suggests that consensual democracy is suitable for African society. 
According to Mandela, “Democracy meant all men were to be heard, and a decision was taken 
together as a people. Majority rule was a foreign notion” (Mandela 1994:29). From the above 
quotation, it is evident that Mandela is interested in consensus that is borne out of total 
agreement. From the above view, there is a sense in which one could argue that Mandela had 
consensual democracy in mind in line with Wiredu. This became evident when he brought in the 
idea of majority rule (majoritarian democracy) as a contrast. Mandela’s notion of democracy 
involves equality, equal consideration and general participation. With all these features, it is not 
clear whether the interests of the minority were ever denied at any point in time, even in the 
traditional African societies. I shall return to this under the assessment so as not to jump the gun.
Moreover, there is also another form of consensus that is attributed to a renowned social 
and political philosopher, namely John Rawls. This version of consensus is termed an 
overlapping consensus. Rawls conceives an overlapping consensus as 
a consensus in which it is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a more or less just constitutional 
democracy, where the criterion of justice is that political conception itself (Rawls 
1987:20). 
Following John Rawls’s interpretation of consensus, he characterises agreement on basic 
principles of justice among individuals embracing a plurality of different, occasionally conflicting, 
comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical outlooks (Rawls 1996:385). Evidently, it could 
be inferred that Rawls’s overlapping consensus could be interpreted as a form of deliberative 
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consensus. Thus, this kind of consensus is not inconsistent with Wiredu’s view. Also, the view 
that consensus and democracy are not mutually exclusive was reinforced by Joe Teffo, who 
underscores the argument that the principle of consensus is a feature of democracy (Teffo 
2004:445). Not only does this view support the position maintained in this paper; it also serves as 
a critique to Wiredu who defended a contrary opinion. 
Now, what do we make out of the above analysis? What should be our concern next is that, 
given that consensus can be described, practised and achieved in different ways, we need to 
examine the sense in which Wiredu used the term "consensus". Wiredu himself did not tell us 
expressly the sense in which he employed the word. But in the first page of Chapter Fourteen of 
his Cultural Universals and Particulars, it could be inferred that Wiredu appeals to a kind of 
consensus that is born of total agreement though rational deliberation. For him, consensus is 
reached through rational deliberation (Wiredu 1996: 185). One question is: is Wiredu consistent 
with this version of consensus? In my view, the problem of inconsistency is present in this case. 
Now, how does this inconsistency undermine his defence of consensual democracy? We shall 
return to these under the topic assessment. Meanwhile, let us consider next Wiredu’s defence of 
consensual democracy. 
Wiredu’s defence of consensual democracy
Argument 1 
The argument here is that consensual democracy takes care of the interests of the minority. 
According to Wiredu, the pursuit of consensus or consensual democracy was a deliberate effort 
to go beyond decision by majority … majority opinion in itself is not a good enough basis for 
decision-making, for it deprives the minority of the right to have their will reflected (Wiredu 
1996:186).
The argument can be summarised thus:
P.1. Any system of government that takes care of the interests of the minority is better
P.2. Consensual Democracy takes better care of the interests of the minority than 
majoritarian democracy
Therefore, consensual democracy is better than majoritarian democracy. 
 I will come back to this in the next section. 
Argument 2
According to Wiredu, consensus is not just an optional bonus, it is essential for securing 
substantive, or what might be called decisional, representation for representatives and through 
them for citizens at large (Wiredu 1996:189). Similarly, on another page, Wiredu repeats the view 
that consensual democracy is better than majoritarian democracy because for him, it offers what 
he calls a substantive representation over and above the former representation (Matolino 
2012:112). The question here is whether substantive representation is a true reflection of 
fundamental human rights in a democratic setting. One thing that Wiredu has taken for granted is 
that one person is elected to represent a group or community does not necessarily mean that 
such a person will truly represent their will or interests when he/she gets there. Example abound 
in African politics where representatives of the people end up representing their own personal 
interests through their corrupt practices. For instance, in 1995, Tom Lodge wrote extensively on 
the widespread political corruption in South Africa (Lodge 1995:157). Similarly, in African 
Leaders and Corruption Khalil Timamy also exposes how African democratic leaders in quasi-
democratic regimes (Bongo’s Gabon, Biya’s Cameroon, Chiluba’s Zambia, Muluzi’s Malawi, 
Moi’s Kenya, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, etc.) have used their political position, as the representatives 
of their people, to embezzle the economic resources of those nations (Timamy 2005:383). These 
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political leaders were supposed to be the representatives of their people, but they ended up 
fighting for their private purses. 
One question that calls for critical reflection is whether majoritarian democracy necessarily 
eschews the idea of substantive representation. We return a negative answer. I shall come back 
to revisit this under the heading assessment.
Then there is this important question, raised by Harry Lloyd: does consensus democracy 
improve the quality of government? (Lloyd 2016:1) This question is important to this paper as we 
need to understand whether adoption of consensual democracy in present-day African politics 
will remove the prevalent socio-political challenges such as corruption, poverty, and the 
marginalisation of the interests of the minority. Our view in this paper is that it is not clear whether 
it has succeeded in these areas. The reason behind this sceptical attitude is that if it has 
succeeded in the past, why change the winning formula? Let us now turn to the next section for 
more elaborate explanation and a critical assessment of Wiredu’s view. 
Assessment of Wiredu’s argument 
This section engages the existing view presented in the literature review. It also points out what 
is problematic about Wiredu’s claim, in accordance with our earlier statement of the research 
problem. 
Argument concerning the problem of coerced agreement 
In the previous section, I discussed Wiredu’s argument in defence of consensual democracy in 
traditional African society. In Argument 1, Wiredu argues that consensual democracy is better 
than majoritarian democracy simply because he feels that the former takes care of the interests 
of the minority. However, there are objections against this view. On the one hand, it is not proved 
whether the interests of the minority have been denied at any point in time due to the incidence 
of inter/intra-ethnic crises and conflicts even in traditional African society. Given human nature, a 
clash of interests is inevitable in any human society. According to Richard Sandbrook, inter/intra-
ethnic crises have been proved to be the basis for fierce rivalry for economic resources and 
political power in traditional Africa society (Sandbrook 1972:106-107). I agree with Sandbrook for 
the fact that, on several occasions, a clash of interests (economic or political) between the 
majority and minority groups is always the cause of inter/intra-ethnic conflicts in any human 
society. 
Arising from the above development, it should be noted that Wiredu, in his explanation, did 
not make provision for the possibility of clashes of interests or irresolvable differences between 
the majority and the minority in a traditional African society, even in relation to the decision-
making process. My worry is that in case of irreconcilable differences due to a clash of interests, 
how will consensus be reached? And if consensus is not reached, how will the interests of the 
minority be protected in the face of unsolvabe differences between the majority and the minority? 
These are vital issues, worth ruminating over. As a matter of fact, this may be the reason Eze 
accused Wiredu of porttraying an exaggerated harmony in traditional African society (Eze 
1999:213). 
On the other hand, contrary to Wiredu’s submission, a majority can even be dominated by 
the minority. In other words, it is not impossible for the interests of the minority to dominate the 
interests of the majority, even in the so-called democratic settings. The argument is that it is not 
practically impossible for the minority to dominate the majority by coercing them to agree with 
their proposal in order to reach consensus. For instance, in traditional African society that Wiredu 
talked about, there were sages or so-called wise, powerful and respected people more confident 
than others, good at speaking, and with a good command of language. This set of people, 
though always in the minority, often dominate discussions when decisions are to be made. Odera 
Oruka describes these kinds of people as 
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... men and women (sages) many of whom have not had the benefit of modern educa-
tion. But they are, nevertheless, critical, independent thinkers who guide their thoughts 
and judgments by the power of reason and inborn insight rather than by the authority of 
the communal consensus. They are capable of taking a problem or a concept and 
offering a rigorous philosophical analysis of it, making clear rationally where they 
accept or reject the established or communal judgment on the matter (Oruka 1991: 11).
What does this suggest? These people with superior arguments, though in the minority, have 
what it takes to manipulate the majority. Thus, these people (the ‘loudest voices’ in the society) 
can coerce the remaining majority to agree with them in order to reach consensus since they 
have the charisma and sugar-quoted mouths to convince the majority. The implication of this is 
that the so-called consensual democracy will end up jettisoning the interests of the majority. This 
is due to the fact that the minority who can use their wisdom, or power of oration, to their own 
advantage in order to coerce the majority into reaching consensus. In addition, social pressure 
and fear could deter some people in the majority from speaking against the view of the “loudest 
voices” in the society in a decision-making process and thus to be forced to remain silent, which 
will be counted as consent in order to reach coerced consensus. The point we are making is that, 
philosophically speaking, silence may not necessarily mean consent in all cases. More 
importantly, one problematic question that comes to mind is whether complete consensus really 
exists in Africa or anywhere in the world? The answer to this question is controversial.
Similarly, despite the fact that scholars including Wiredu often discuss consensus alongside 
the idea of equality and human rights in traditional Africa, the truth remains that traditional African 
society was not a classless society in practice. This view is in contrast with Nyerere’s view that 
traditional African socialist society was a classless society (Nyerere 1968: 11). My point, in line 
with Eze, is that the kind of equality that Wiredu and Nyerere claim was exaggerated. 
Consequently, following Karl Marx’s dominant ideology thesis, Marx argues that “the ruling class 
in every epoch has the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at 
the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx 1974:64). What this suggests is that in every 
society there are always dominant views, and the dominant view is always the view of the 
dominant class. Essentially, I do not think that the case is different in traditional African society. 
Majoritarian democracy and majoritarian consensus 
Is consensual democracy really antithetical to majoritarian democracy? I return a negative 
answer. My argument here is that majoritarian democracy that Wiredu rejected is not necessarily 
antithetical to consensual democracy. There are different types of consensus such as an 
imposed consensus, an acclaimed consensus, and a basic consensus, which are compatible 
with majoritarian democracy. Let us start our analysis from the first type of consensus. In an 
imposed consensus, for instance, we have a claim (e.g. by the chairperson that presides over a 
particular meeting) that consensus has been reached with no opportunity for the meeting 
participants to oppose this claim. This is not different from a majoritarian democracy where the 
majority wins. Also, in an acclaimed consensus, there is an explicit opportunity for participants to 
express their views, but its official purpose is not to express dissent but consent. The question is, 
how is this form of consensus different from majoritarian democracy? Furthermore, in basic 
consensus, participants are explicitly asked if there is anyone who disagrees, and a stretch of 
"audible silence" passes before the consensual decision is confirmed. In fact, I consider this to 
be a dubious way of reaching consensus. The reason for this is that the idea that silence means 
consent could be a fraud. Silence may not mean consent in all cases. The fact that people are 
silent over a decision does not necessarily mean that they have agreed or consented. They may 
be indifferent. 
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Thus, so long as imposed, acclaimed and basic consensus are versions of consensual 
democracy, they are not really antithetical to majoritarian democracy. This view actually leads us 
to what I have called majoritarian consensus1. Wiredu’s idea of consensus is not too far 
removed from what we call majoritarian democracy, because Wiredu himself admitted that 
“consensus does not in general entail total agreement” (Wiredu 1996:183). Thus, if “total 
agreement” is interpreted to mean complete, full or entire agreement, then what follows is that 
the same sentence could be read as: Wiredu’s kind of consensus does not in general entail 
complete, full or entire agreement. To illustrate this, let us assume that there is a particular 
society called society X with a population of three million people. In this society, decision is to be 
made through rational deliberation and two million, seven hundred thousand people agreed or 
consented to the outcome of the deliberation while three hundred thousand people disagreed. 
Now, going by my interpretation of Wiredu’s claim that consensus does not in general entail total 
agreement, it actually means that consensus was reached in society X even though it was not a 
product of total agreement but a product of majority agreement. Now, the point I am driving at is 
that from empirical assessment, Wiredu’s notion of consensus or consensual democracy is not 
different from what I called majoritarian consensus. As the name suggests, this is a kind of 
consensus that is reached by the decision-making process of the majority. The argument in 
essence is that, in a careful reading, the gap between consensual democracy and majoritarian 
democracy is not as wide as Wiredu has suggested. In other words, majoritarian democracy is 
not incompatible with consensual democracy.
Majoritarian democracy and substantive representations 
In Argument 2 above, Wiredu argues that consensual democracy is better than majoritarian 
democracy because for him it offers what he calls a substantive representation over and above 
formal representative (Wiredu 1996: 185, Matolino 2012:112). The question is: what is this 
substantive representation? And how do we measure substantive representation in traditional 
African society? In The Concept of Representation, Anna Pitkin defines substantive 
representation as a process of “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive 
to them” (Pitkin, 1967:209). In view of the above definition, it is obvious that some African political 
leaders and politicians do not really act in the interests of the people they represent. Similarly, 
Karen Celis and Sarah Child also define substantive representation as a kind of representation 
that captures a relationship between the represented and representative in which the 
represented are ‘logically prior’, whereby the representatives must be responsive to the 
represented and not the other way around (Karen, 1998:100). In The Concept of Representation
mentioned earlier, Pitkin basically identified four main type or categories of representation, 
namely: formal, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967). Wiredu’s 
preference for substantive representation above formal representation actually finds support in 
Pitkin’s work; Pitkin also defended the view that substantive representation yields better results 
than the other three. Now, the question is whether substantive representative is achievable under 
majoritarian democracy. Going by the above definitions, my answer is that it is achievable. In a 
majoritarian democracy where an election is held and someone with the highest number of votes 
emerges as a winner in order to represent his people, such elected representative is actually 
expected to represent the interest of the represented in a responsive manner. Thus, Wiredu’s 
claim that consensual democracy is essential for securing substantive representation for the 
people does not necessarily undermine majoritarian democracy. The reason is that majoritarian 
1.  Majoritarian consensus will be a form of consensus by the majority of the people, that is, consensus that is reached by 
the decision-making process of the majority. This is in line with Brian William’s analysis and notion of ‘simple majority’ 
consensus as opposed to unanimous consensus. “Simple majority” consensus level would be fifty percent plus one vote, 
while a unanimous consensus level would be when everybody agrees. 
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democracy also permits substantive representation for the representatives. In other words, the 
idea that substantive representation is mainly achievable under consensual democracy as 
portrayed by Wiredu could be contested. 
Possible objection and response 
One possible objection that could easily be raised against the above position in this paper is 
whether African traditional life is still in existence or whether the whole discussion has merit at all.
This is a valid observation. However, the relevance of this discussion is tied to the valuable 
insight it offered the inevitable problem which Africa has, to sooner rather than later consider giv-
en the way democracy is being practised within the continent in comparison with the Western 
world. Now, the rejoinder to the question of whether African traditional life is still in existence is 
not really a threat to the view that I maintain in this paper. Instead, as a matter of fact, it poses a 
further threat to Wiredu’s argument that the method of governance used in traditional Africa 
could also be effective in modern Africa society. In essence, the above observation and response 
further reveal possible weaknesses of Wiredu’s argument. 
Conclusion 
The article has sought to analyse and juxtapose consensual democracy with its majoritarian 
democracy counterpart, particularly as it affects the issues of minority interests and better 
representation. Are consensual democracy and majoritarian democracy mutually exclusive? My 
answer in this paper is that they are not. This article has argued that the implications and 
challenges of majoritarian democracy identified by Wiredu do not necessarily undermine 
majoritarian democracy, neither do they make his suggested decision by consensus a workable 
decision-making process in contemporary African society. Furthermore, this article has not 
claimed that majoritarian democracy is a defensible position; rather, our claim is that at certain 
levels of discussion, Wiredu’s idea of consensus (consensual democracy) has some similarities 
and also faces similar challenges to those that (majoritarian) democracy faces. 
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